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Abstract
We investigate the formation of opinion against authority in an authoritarian
society composed of agents with different levels of authority. We explore a “dis-
senting” opinion, held by lower-ranking, obedient, or less authoritative people,
spreading in an environment of an “affirmative” opinion held by authoritative
leaders. A real-world example would be a corrupt society where people revolt
against such leaders, but it can be applied to more general situations. In our
model, agents can change their opinion depending on their authority relative
to their neighbors and their own confidence level. In addition, with a certain
probability, agents can override the affirmative opinion to take the dissenting
opinion of a neighbor. Based on analytic derivation and numerical simulations,
we observe that both the network structure and heterogeneity in authority, and
their correlation, significantly affect the possibility of the dissenting opinion to
spread through the population. In particular, the dissenting opinion is sup-
pressed when the authority distribution is very heterogeneous and there exists
a positive correlation between the authority and the number of neighbors of
people (degree). Except for such an extreme case, though, spreading of the
dissenting opinion takes place when people have the tendency to override the
authority to hold the dissenting opinion, but the dissenting opinion can take a
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long time to spread to the entire society, depending on the model parameters.
We argue that the internal social structure of agents sets the scale of the time to
reach consensus, based on the analysis of the underlying structural properties
of opinion spreading.
Keywords: Opinion dynamics, Complex network, Authoritarian society
1. Introduction
How much an opinion against a firmly established authority can spread in
a population is an important estimate of the population’s adaptability [1], in
particular when there exists a strong heterogeneity in the distribution of influ-
ential power regarding opinion formation. The topic of opinion formation has
been studied widely to reveal the hidden mechanisms of a collective opinion
dynamics on social networks [2–5]. There has been a wide variety of opinion
formation models, such as the voter model [6, 7], the majority rule model [8], the
bounded confidence model [9], and the Sznajd model [10]. Many opinion forma-
tion models have focused on the effect of heterogeneity in a network structure for
a global consensus [11] and considered heterogeneous distributions of personal
characteristics—gender, age, job, economic level, personal interests [12, 13], and
so on, as those two areas of heterogeneity are important for opinion dynamics
on networks [14, 15].
However, most of those opinion formation models mix the concept of het-
erogeneity in the individual level with the heterogeneity in social structures,
even though structural and individual heterogeneity can be independent of each
other [16, 17]. Previous studies derive the personal heterogeneity in influential
power from the structural heterogeneity, such as the number of neighbors (or
“degree,” in the terminology of network science) [11] or PageRank (or “eigen-
vector centrality”) [18, 19]. There have been other attempts to highlight het-
erogeneity in individual attributes [20–23], as well as in authority dispersion
and in asymmetric options. [24] and asymmetric opinions [25]. Nevertheless, all
these are different from the genuine authority dispersion, so we are still lack
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understanding of the transmission of opinions held by non-influential agents,
grounded in the heterogeneity of both network-structural properties and influ-
ential power or authority. To address this need, in this paper, we investigate
the following questions: when a population is composed of different levels of
authority of agents, how can an opinion held by obedient agents with less in-
fluential power be spread to the whole population? How do the structure and
authority collectively contribute to the spreading process?
To answer these questions, we introduce a stylized opinion formation model
in a population with the prescribed authority scores assigned to its agents, who
are connected via networks [26]. We assume heterogeneously distributed author-
ity scores assigned to the agents, and each agent additionally has two essential
characteristics: the willingness to uphold a dissenting opinion against authority
and the confidence level for their own opinion. The probability of dissent is
characterized by the parameter hinted at in the experiment of Milgram [27],
which exemplifies the obedient tendency to an authoritative person’s injustice
order for the individual level, along with the tendency to resist the authority
when there exist companions who would do so together. The agents apply the
social comparison process to judge the relative authority level [28]. An illus-
trative case is a corrupt society where authoritative agents have an agreement
on a certain immoral decision, and a less influential population has a dissenting
opinion against it. As the results of our analysis, we present the crucial role
of the correlation between network structure and authority, via intrinsic social
relations representing the authority comparison process.
2. Model
To model the society presented in Sec. 1, for each individual we take het-
erogeneous degree distributions representing heterogeneous networks structures
where individuals reside, heterogeneous authority levels of the individuals, and
the correlation between them. In addition, we also incorporate individuals’ inner
characteristics for the confidence to their own opinion and willingness to follow
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the dissenting opinion. For heterogeneous structures, we construct a network
composed of N agents as nodes; thus, we use the terms “agent” and “node”
interchangeably in this paper. The edges between the nodes represent the rela-
tionship between the nodes on which the authority comparison and the opinion
spreading are based.
For network generation, we use an unweighted and undirected scale-free
network (SFN) without self-loop and multiple edges, from the configuration
model [29]. The degree distribution follows the power-law, p(k) ∼ k−λ, which
yields a degree sequence {ki} for node i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} (thus there exist
N nodes in total). We set the minimum degree kmin = 2 for the initial network
construction. To keep the overall connectivity, we use the largest connected
component from the initially constructed network for the dynamics of our model.
We verify that the change of network sizes in terms of the number of nodes and
edges due to this selection process is negligible. Given the resultant connected
network, we adjust the degree exponent λ to control the degree heterogeneity,
where the smaller λ results in more heterogeneous degree distributions. When
λ = 2, the average degree 〈k〉 ' 9, and the maximum degree kmax ' 306.
For λ = 3, 〈k〉 ' 4 and kmax ' 100. As the control group compared to such
heterogeneous structures, we also take the fully connected network to simulate
the well-mixed population, which is expected to more accurately follow the result
of the analytic derivation based on the mean-field approximation in Sec. 3.
For the authoritarian structure, we assign an intrinsic authority score {si}
to each node i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}. To generate heterogeneous authority scores,
we extract random numbers (real numbers, in contrast to the natural numbers
for the degree sequence {ki} by definition) from the power-law distribution
p(s) ∼ s−γ with the minimum value of unity. The setup is inspired by the
Pareto distribution [30] of wealth and income, which are indirect representatives
of authority. Therefore, in general, we have two sets of power-law distributed
values: λ for the degrees {ki} and γ for the authority scores {si}. For simplicity,
however, we use the same power-law exponent for the authority score and degree,
i.e., λ = γ in our model, assuming that the same power-law exponent controls
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both structural and authoritarian heterogeneities. The set of authority scores
{si} for agents i ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1} will be correlated with the agents’ degree
with different types of correlations. In addition, we take the two representative
cases for the degree exponent to see the effect of the heterogeneity of degree
distribution: relatively heterogeneous γ = 2 and relative homogeneous γ = 3.
To investigate the effect of the correlation between authority and network
structures [16, 17], we take three types of correlations: positive, no (uncorre-
lated), and negative correlations. The positive correlation implies that agents
with higher authority scores have larger degree values. To control the correla-
tion in practice, we sort both {si} and {ki} from the smallest to the largest and
match the indices of the sorted {si} with the sorted {ki} in their exact order (as
a result, the rank-based correlations such as Spearman’s r or Kendall’s τ = 1).
The negative correlation is achieved by the opposite way of ordering, i.e., match-
ing the indices using the ascending order for {si} and the descending order for
{ki} (the rank-based correlations = −1). The uncorrelated case corresponds to
the random matching (the rank-based correlations ' 0 on average).
Each agent in the model selectively accepts her neighbor’s opinion or keeps
her own opinion, depending on the result of the authority comparison [28]. In
addition, she also has an intrinsically biased probability toward the dissenting
opinion. We consider two personal characteristics for the comparison process:
the confidence parameter α and the acceptance probability of the dissenting
opinion p. Here, α and p are global variables at a societal level, i.e., every agent
has the same α and p, for simplification. Each agent i has the time-dependent
binary opinion variable σi(t) ∈ {0, 1} at time t, where 0 represents the authori-
tative opinion and 1 represents the dissenting opinion in our convention. If we
assume a corrupt society where an immoral opinion of the dominant authority
prevails, the dissenting opinion of less influential people would be a desirable
choice. Throughout the paper, therefore, we use the expression “dissenting” or
“opposing” opinion for the less influential people’s opinion, as the opposite of
the “authoritative” or “affirmative” opinion held by authoritative people.
For the temporal evolution of the agents’ opinion, at each time step, we
5
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Figure 1: Snapshots of the opinion change in our model. The numbers inside the nodes
indicate the relative rank i ∈ {0, 1, . . . 9} for authority, where the larger values correspond
to higher authority, which are used as the node indices in our description. The color of the
nodes represents their opinion: red for the dissenting opinion (σi = 1) and green for the
affirmative (σi = 0) opinions. The numbers outside the nodes indicate the authority scores
{si|i = 0, 1, . . . 9}. The nodes compare their authority scores by Eq. (1). For instance, node
3 chooses node 7 for the comparison (the blue edge), and takes node 7’s opinion (σ3 = 0→ 1
at t = 1, because σ7(t = 0) = 0 and q(s3, s7;α) < 0 (corresponding to the “q” process as
denoted in the figure) in Eq. (1) when node 7 has a larger authority score than that of node 3.
At t = 2, node 8 chooses node 4 (the purple edge), and with the probability p (corresponding
to the “p” process as denoted in the figure), regardless of their authority scores, node 8 takes
the dissenting (σ4 = 1) opinion of node 4 (σ8 = 0→ 1).
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Table 1: The decision table for σi(t + 1), where Θ[q] with q ≡ q(si, sj ;α) in Eq. (1) is the
Heaviside step function.
σj(t) = 1 σj(t) = 0
p 1 σi(t)Θ[q]
1− p 1− [1− σi(t)]Θ[q] σi(t)Θ[q]
select a node (denoted by i) uniformly at random and also choose one of its
neighbors, denoted by j, uniformly at random. Then, node i first checks node
j’s opinion. If σj(t) = 1 (the dissenting opinion), with the probability p (denoted
by the “p” process in Fig. 1), she accepts the dissenting opinion of node j, i.e.,
σi(t+ 1) = 1, regardless of her current opinion σi(t) and their relative authority
scores si and sj . With the complementary probability 1− p when σj(t) = 1, or
when σj(t) = 0, node i compares her authority score with that of node j and
decides whether or not she follows node j’s opinion, regardless of the current
σj(t) value (denoted by the “q” process in Fig. 1). The criterion is calculated
based on their authority scores si and sj , and the confidence level α. It is based
on the impact function
q(si, sj ;α) ≡ αsi − (1− α)sj . (1)
If q(si, sj ;α) ≥ 0, node i keeps her opinion, i.e., σi(t+ 1) = σi(t). Otherwise, if
q(si, sj ;α) < 0, node i follows node j’s opinion, i.e., σi(t+1) = σj(t). Therefore,
large values of α represent a stronger tendency to keep the nodes’ own opinion.
We believe that this rule captures an aspect of human psychology revealed
by the experiment of Milgram [27]—the existence of a companion who raises
the dissenting opinion is crucial for an individual’s objection to the immoral
authority. Note that the present model includes the conventional voter model
as a limiting case when p = α = 0. Table 1 summarizes the rule, and Fig. 1
illustrates an example case of the opinion evolution.
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3. Results
In this section, we present the numerical simulation results supported by
the analytic calculation on the stability condition of the dissenting opinion,
in regard to the correlation between the degree and the authority score with
different degree heterogeneity, namely, γ = 2 and 3. We mainly focus on the
final or steady-state fraction of the dissenting opinion in the network and the
time to reach a consensus or steady state. The opinion averaged over agents
and network realizations is expressed as
m(t) = 〈σν;i(t)〉 = 1
n
n−1∑
ν=0
[
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
σν;i(t)
]
, (2)
where ν ∈ {0, 1, · · · , n− 1} is the index of independent realization of a network
sample and σν;i(t) ∈ {0, 1} (recall that 0 is the affirmative opinion and 1 is
the dissenting opinion) is the opinion of agent i at time t, for the particular
realization ν. In the simulations, we take N = 1000 and n = 2000, unless
otherwise stated.
The average opinion m(t) eventually reaches the consensus m(t) = 0 or
m(t) = 1 (which are the two absorbing states in our model, as no further
change of opinion is possible once the network reaches one of the consensus
states by the rule of our model) for a finite-size network, if we do not consider
the practical time limitation. However, for finite-time simulations, there could
be a steady state without reaching the consensus. When the average opinion
m(t) only slightly fluctuates around a specific finite value (0 < m(t) < 1) for
a sufficient period, we consider the state as the balanced point for the opinion
change from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0, which we denote by the nontrivial steady
state.
We assume that the system reaches the nontrivial steady state if m(t) fluc-
tuates within a given range (denoted by f) for at least tc consecutive time steps,
which is required for finite-size systems in finite-time numerical simulations. For
practical simulations, we first wait for tmax = 1000 time steps (we use the Monte
Carlo time steps where N trials of opinion changes correspond to a single unit
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of time, for numerical simulations) to check if the system reaches the absorbing
states m(t) = 0 or m(t) = 1. When m(t < tmax) = 0 or m(t < tmax) = 1, we halt
the simulation and record the consensus time denoted by τ . If the system does
not reach the absorbing states until t = tmax, we wait for the nontrivial steady
state satisfying |mν(t−u+ 1)−mν(t−u)| < f ∀u ∈ {0, 1, · · · , tc− 2, tc− 1} for
tc consecutive times (we set f = 0.05 and tc = 1000 based on the fluctuation in
our observation). When m(t) meets the nontrivial steady state criterion for the
first time, we denote the time for reaching the nontrivial steady state by τs = t.
With N = 1000, the system always reaches the steady state with the given f
value, if it does not reach the consensus before tmax. Note that the consensus
states m(t) = 0 and m(t) = 1 are also (denoted by “trivial,” in that case) steady
states, so τs = τ for such cases. In other words, we denote both trivial and non-
trivial steady states by τs, and τ exclusively refers to the former case: consensus
or absorbing states. With this setting, we explore the equally spaced parameter
ranges α ∈ {0.00, 0.05, ..., 0.95, 1.00} and p ∈ {0.00, 0.05, ..., 0.95, 1.00}.
3.1. The fully connected network and the SFN without correlations
First, let us check the effects of authority heterogeneity only, by taking the
fully connected network structure. Figure 2 shows m(τs) in the fully connected
network in which the authority scores of individual nodes keep the unique hetero-
geneity. To understand the result analytically, we derive the stability condition
for the steady state of opinions. Basically, at time t, node i [with the authority
score si and opinion σi(t)] interacts with its random neighbor j [with sj and
σj(t)]. Then, node i’s opinion at time t+ 1 is determined as Table 1.
In this case, all of the agents are statistically equivalent and the neighbors
are chosen uniformly at random (well-mixed population). If we denote the
fraction of agents with the opinion 1 at time t by m(t), the probability of
σi(t) = 1 and that of σj(t) = 1 are also m(t) = 〈σi(t)〉, where the angular
bracket denotes the agent-and-ensemble-averaged quantity and m(t) becomes
equivalent to the definition in Eq. (2). According to Table 1, with the shorthand
notation q ≡ q(si, sj ;α) in Eq. (1) and m ≡ m(t), the probability of σi(t+1) = 1,
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: The average opinion m(τs) at the steady state in Eq. (2) with N = 1000, av-
eraged over n = 2000 realizations for the fully connected network case, with the authority
heterogeneity exponents (a) γ = 2 and (b) γ = 3.
or equivalently the average opinion of i is
〈σi(t+ 1)〉 = pm+ p(1−m)mPr[q ≥ 0]
+ (1− p)m{m+ (1− Pr[q ≥ 0]−m(1− Pr[q ≥ 0])}
+ (1− p)(1−m)mPr[q ≥ 0] ,
(3)
where we assume the independence of the current opinion and (static) authority
and Pr[q ≥ 0] denotes the probability that the inequality q ≥ 0 holds. Rear-
ranging all of the terms and imposing the steady state condition 〈σi(t + 1)〉 =
〈σi(t)〉 = m, we obtain
pmPr[q ≥ 0] = pm2Pr[q ≥ 0] , (4)
where replacing the instantaneous opinions σi(t) and σi(t+1) with the averaged
opinions 〈σi(t)〉 = m(t) and 〈σi(t+1)〉 = m(t+1) corresponds to our mean-field
assumption.
For the network without any correlation between the degree and the author-
ity score as the simplest case, which corresponds to both the fully connected
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Figure 3: Pr[q ≥ 0] for (a) the negatively correlated network case [Eq. (10)], (b) uncorrelated
network case [Eq. (11)], and (c) positively correlated network case [Eq. (12)].
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network and the SFN without any correlation between the degree and the au-
thority scores, let us consider the explicit form of Pr[q ≥ 0]. We give the
power-law form of the authority distribution p(s) = (γ − 1)s−γ with smin = 1
[for the proper normalization
∫∞
1
ds p(s) = 1]. Then, because p(si) and p(sj)
are independent to each other, we express Pr[q ≥ 0] as
Pr[q ≥ 0] =
∫ ∞
1
dsj
∫ ∞
1
dsi p(si) p(sj)Θ[q]
=
∫ ∞
1
dsj p(sj)
∫ ∞
max [1,(1−α)sj/α]
dsi p(si) ,
(5)
where Θ(q) is the Heaviside step function (= 1 when q ≥ 0 and = 0 when q < 0).
When α ≤ 1/2 [thus (1− α)/α ≥ 1],
max
(
1,
1− α
α
sj
)
=
1− α
α
sj , (6)
always, as si ≥ 1. Therefore, the integral in Eq. (5) becomes∫ ∞
1
dsj p(sj)
∫ ∞
(1−α)sj/α
dsi p(si) . (7)
When α > 1/2 [thus (1− α)/α < 1],
max
(
1,
1− α
α
sj
)
=

1− α
α
sj , for sj ≥ α
1− α
1, for sj <
α
1− α ,
(8)
so we have to split the integration range for sj in Eq. (5) as∫ ∞
1
dsj p(sj)
∫ ∞
max {1,(1−α)sj/α}
dsi p(si)
=
∫ α/(1−α)
1
dsj p(sj)
∫ ∞
1
dsi p(si)
+
∫ ∞
α/(1−α)
dsj p(sj)
∫ ∞
(1−α)sj/α
dsi p(si) .
(9)
Combining the two cases, we obtain
Pr[q ≥ 0] =

1
2
(
α
1− α
)γ−1
, for α ≤ 1/2
1− 1
2
(
1− α
α
)γ−1
, for α > 1/2 .
(10)
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(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 4: The average opinion m(τs) at the steady state in Eq. (2) with N = 1000, averaged
over n = 2000 realizations with different correlations between degree k and authority score s
in different power-law exponents for authority and degree distribution. The upper panels are
the γ = 2 cases with (a) negative, (b) no, and (c) positive correlations. The lower panels are
the γ = 3 cases with (d) negative, (e) no, and (f) positive correlations.
When α = 1/2, Eq. (10) gives Pr[q ≥ 0] = 1/2 guaranteeing the continuity of
the function. Another limiting case is α = 1, where Pr[q ≥ 0] = 1 (agent i
always beats agent j). Figure 3(a) shows the functional form of Pr[q ≥ 0] given
by Eq. (10). If we substitute Pr[q ≥ 0] in Eq. (10) into Eq. (4), as we usually
consider γ > 1, the steady-state with 0 < m < 1 is possible for α = 0 or p = 0.
Therefore, when p > 0 and Pr[q ≥ 0] > 0, for the system to reach the steady
state, m should be either 0 or 1 (in practice, due to the intrinsic asymmetry
between 0 and 1 for p > 0, the simulation results almost always converge to
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m = 1) or the consensus. The nontrivial steady-state with 0 < m < 1 is
possible only for Pr[q ≥ 0] = 0 or p = 0. From the results, we confirm the clear
L-shaped boundary on α = 0, p = 0 axes, and it matches well with the numerical
result shown in Fig. 2. In the α > 0 and p > 0 regime, there is a successful
transmission of the dissenting opinion initially held by lower-ranked nodes in
terms of authority. The result m(τs) ' 0.5 at α = p = 0 is also consistent with
the conventional voter model at that point. The only difference between γ = 2
and γ = 3 (Fig. 2) is a larger strap for nonzero m values near the p = 0 axis for
the γ = 3 case [Fig. 2(b)] than that of the γ = 2 case [Fig. 2(a)].
Again, we would like to emphasize that the analytic derivation up to this
point applies not only to the fully connected network, but also to the SFN
without any correlation between the degrees and authority scores, as shown in
Figs. 4(b) and 4(e), because the probability of choosing node j (proportional to
her degree kj [16, 17]) is independent of her authority score sj for both cases.
To be more precise, all of the elements of {kj |j = 0, 1, · · · , N−1} themselves are
identical for the fully connected network, and kj is independent of sj for the SFN
without any correlation between kj and sj . Therefore, as expected, the same L-
shaped nontrivial steady-state regions appear as in the fully connected network
case (Fig. 2). The results of the SFN cases in general show the same L-shaped
nontrivial steady state in Figs. 4(a), 4(b), 4(d), and 4(e) except for Figs. 4(c)
and 4(f) for the positive correlation between the degree and the authority score.
We explore such a possibility of nontrivial steady states with α > 0 and p > 0
values in the next section.
3.2. The SFN with positive correlation between authority scores and degrees
The nontrivial steady state in the positive correlation case when γ = 2 in
Fig. 4(c) confirms the existence of the nontrivial steady state (0 < m(τs) < 1)
with the positive correlation. It confirms that the positive correlation between
the heterogeneous network structures and the authority scores effectively blocks
the spreading of the opposing opinion with the authoritarian suppression. Con-
sidering the parameter p forces the nodes to be biased toward the dissenting
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opinion, it is clear that the positively correlated degrees and authority scores
makes the spreading difficult. Since the probability p represents the willingness
to accept a neighbor’s dissenting opinion against the authority, the increment
of m(τs) with it in Fig. 4(c) reflects the crucial role of inner motivation p in the
spreading of the dissent opinion. Without it (when p = 0), the system can be
dominated by the affirmative opinion.
We can understand the nontriviality of the positive correlation with the
analytic approach in the following. For simplicity, we assume the completely
positively correlated case, i.e., the case that the authority and degree coincide
(or at least they are described by the same power-law exponent as mentioned in
Sec. 2). In addition, p(sj) = (γ − 1)s−γj for the uncorrelated network should be
replaced with p(sj) = (γ−2)s1−γj because the probability of being a neighbor will
be proportional to the neighbor’s authority (= degree) and the exponent for the
power-law distribution is modified by 1 (the celebrated “friendship paradox” [16,
17]). In that case, the probability becomes
Pr[q ≥ 0] =

γ − 2
2γ − 3
(
α
1− α
)γ−1
, for α ≤ 1/2
1− γ − 1
2γ − 3
(
1− α
α
)γ−2
, for α > 1/2 .
(11)
One can also check the continuity of Eq. (11) at α = 1/2. Figure 3(b) shows
the functional form of Pr[q ≥ 0] given by Eq. (11). The stability condition for
0 < m < 1 requiring α = 0 or p = 0, therefore, is not affected by the correlated
network, as long as γ > 2.
For γ ≤ 2, things get tricky as the distribution p(sj) itself cannot be properly
normalized (so we will need an extra cutoff, such as an exponential tail). For
instance, as γ → 2+, Pr[q ≥ 0]→ 0 according to Eq. (11) [γ = 2.01 in Fig. 3(b)],
implying that the 0 < m < 1 stable state is possible for any α(< 1) and p values.
This illustrates the situation that spreading of the dissenting opinion can be
severely suppressed by dominating hubs (with large degree and authority at the
same time) as we confirm with Fig. 4(c).
Figure 4(c) also displays the crucial role of the confidence level α as a lead-
15
ing factor for the transmission of the dissent opinion. Specifically, α should be
larger than a certain threshold αmax,γ [as shown in Figs. 4(c) and 4(f)], e.g.,
αmax,γ=2 ' 0.6, and αmax,γ=3 ' 0.5. When α is very small (α . 0.1), the system
has a barrier that prevents reaching the consensus of the opposing opinion [see
Figs. 4(c) and 4(f), and Eq. (11)]. With γ = 2, Pr[q ≥ 0] = 0 in Eq. (11), so the
system is able to deliver the dissenting opinion to the entire system more easily,
compared to the case of γ = 3 [Fig. 3(c) versus Fig. 3(f)] where Pr[q ≥ 0] > 0 in
Eq. (11). Only when α & αmax,γ , the successful spreading of the dissenting opin-
ion is possible. The point is closely related to the segregated opinion spreading
groups that will be discussed later in Sec. 3.4. Another notable thing is that the
heterogeneous degree distribution, γ = 2 in this case, with the positive correla-
tion requires a higher confidence level for the spreading of the opposing opinion
than the γ = 3 case, i.e., αmax,γ=2 > αmax,γ=3.
3.3. The SFN with negative correlation between authority scores and degrees
For the negative correlation, let us consider the case si ∝ 1/ki where ki is
the degree of node i. Then, p(sj) = γs
−1−γ
j (the probability of being chosen
as one’s neighbor is inversely proportional to the neighbor’s authority), which
gives
Pr[q ≥ 0] =

γ
2γ − 1
(
α
1− α
)γ−1
, for α ≤ 1/2
1− γ − 1
2γ − 1
(
1− α
α
)γ
, for α > 1/2 .
(12)
In this case, Pr[q ≥ 0] > 1/2 for α = 1/2, implying that “your neighbor is
weaker than you” (the “inverse” friendship paradox [16, 17]). Figure 3(c) shows
the functional form of Pr[q ≥ 0] given by Eq. (12). Unlike the positive correlation
case, Pr[q ≥ 0] = 0 only at α = 0 as γ > 1, so the stability condition is the same
as the uncorrelated network case (α = 0 or p = 0 for the 0 < m < 1 stability)
as shown in Figs. 4(a) and 4(d).
So far, we have shown that γ ≤ 2 with the positive correlation is the only
possible nontrivial steady state condition regardless of α and p. In other corre-
lations, α = 0 or p = 0 is the only possible case allowing nontrivial steady states
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for γ > 2. We also find that finite-size effects are more severe for α  1 with
large γ, where the α value small enough to make Pr[q ≥ 0] ' 0, which is indeed
observable from the results in Fig. 4: a wider stripe near the horizontal axis.
Note that the assumption si ∝ 1/ki is technically different from our negative
correlation case in Sec. 2, where we just use the inverse order between {si} and
{ki}. However, we believe that the stability condition will be the same, based
on the robustness of the condition from the uncorrelated to inversely correlated
cases described in this section.
3.4. Effects of underlying network topology
For a closer examination of the microscopic dynamics of opinion spreading,
we focus on the directionality of opinion adoption represented by the directed
followship network on top of the undirected substrate network, as illustrated
in Fig. 5. The topological change of the followship network is caused by the
sign change of q in Eq. (1) which is a function of α. Consider nodes 2 and
5 whose authority scores s2 = 1.28 and s5 = 1.83, respectively, in Fig. 5(a).
As q(s2, s5;α = 0.3) < 0 and q(s5, s2;α = 0.3) < 0 from Eq. (1), the opinion
can spread in both directions (node 2 → node 5 and node 5 → node 2) for
α = 0.3, represented as a bidirectional edge between the two nodes in Fig. 5(b).
In contrast, q(s2, s5;α = 0.6) > 0 and q(s5, s2;α = 0.6) > 0, so no opinion
can spread between the two nodes in any direction for α = 0.6, represented as
the absence of an edge between the two nodes in Fig. 5(c). Note that it is also
possible for the dissenting opinion to spread from node i to j even if i and j
are not connected in the followship network (as long as i and j are connected in
the original network), since there exists the adoption of a neighbor’s dissenting
opinion regardless of q (the “p” process in Fig. 1), with the probability p.
This simple example shows that a disjoint group from the giant component
(GC) of such a directed followship network can appear depending on the α
value, which corresponds to the percolation transition occurring somewhere in
between Figs. 5(b) and 5(c). In that example, node 2 becomes isolated on
the authority comparison level, so there is no way to change its opinion to
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Figure 5: (a) An example of the followship structure representing the comparison process.
The red (green) nodes correspond to the agents with the opinion 1 (0), respectively. The
red (green) edges connect the two agents with the same opinion = 1 (= 0), respectively, and
the brown edges connect the two agents with different opinions. The authority rank inside
the nodes and the actual authority scores outside the nodes are denoted as in Fig. 1. The
followship structure is shown for (b) α = 0.3 and (c) α = 0.6.
the dissenting opinion by the comparison process. Only the adoption process
of a neighbor’s dissenting opinion regardless of the authority scores with the
probability p allows the opinion change of this isolated node. In this way, the
transmission of the dissenting opinion is related to the structural change for
the comparison process. Figure 6 displays the effect of GC on the consensus
time τ for different α and γ values. We use the fraction of nodes in the GC,
denoted by SGC = nGC/n where nGC is the number of nodes in the giant
component and n is the total number of nodes. For simplicity, we neglect the
directionality for the connected component analysis, or in other words, we take
the weakly connected component. Even though the overall scales of SGC are
different between Figs. 6(a) and 6(b), the location of αmax,γ (the α value when
the maximum value of τ occurs for given γ) marks the segregation of the cluster
in p ≤ 0.5 except for p = 0.1 at γ = 2 (αmax,γ=2 ' 0.6 and αmax,γ=3 ' 0.5).
In general, the consensus time τ increases with α until it reaches the maxi-
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Figure 6: The consensus time τ (the symbols with the solid lines) and the fraction of giant
component SGC (the symbols with the dashed lines), averaged over n = 2000 realizations,
are presented in the upper panels. Panel (a) is for γ = 2, and panel (b) is for γ = 3. Panels
(c) and (d) display the fraction of realizations with the consensus to the dissenting opinion
fR as a function of α. Panel (c) is for γ = 2 and panel (d) is for γ = 3. The fraction fR is
plotted only when the system reaches to the consensus by tmax among the 2000 ensembles
(N = 1000). The lines are the guide to the eyes. The symbols are located at the mean values,
and the corresponding error bars represent the standard error of the mean (the error bars of
τ are smaller than the symbols).
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mum point τmax at α = αmax,γ , and it starts to decrease again when α > αmax,γ .
The result implies that the segregation of opinion-spreading groups affects the
dynamics considerably. The sharp increase of τ near α = αmax,γ stems from the
fragmented components in the opinion-spreading network, while the decrease
of τ for α > αmax,γ is the effect of increment on the viability of the dissenting
opinion by the increased confidence parameter α. As a substantial fraction of
the dissenting opinion survives, the consensus can speed up when α > αmax,γ
overcoming the authoritarian force suppressing the dissenting opinion. This
trend of τ is similar for both γ = 2 and γ = 3 cases, but the reduction of τ
and the prevalence of the dissenting opinion for the γ = 2 case is much more
prominent than that for γ = 3. The exceptional result of τ at p = 0.1 for γ = 2
might come from the relatively large size of GC with small p ' 0.1. As we
explained before, the obvious functional segregation should protect the initial
opinion more in the comparison process. However, a number of beholders of
the dissenting opinion still has to face the social comparison process due to the
small value of p, so the system experiences large fluctuations until it reaches
the consensus and consumes more time. Nevertheless, the maximum time for
the consensus τmax occurs at α = αmax,γ=2 by the structural segregation in the
comparison process.
So far, we have seen the segregation in the opinion spreading depending
on α in terms of consensus time, but it also affects the type of a consensus
(whether m = 1 or m = 0) manifestly [see Figs. 6(c) and 6(d)]. In particular,
we focus on the fraction of consensus to the dissenting opinion, denoted by fR.
As we can observe in Figs. 6(c) and 6(d), a drastic increase of fR occurs at
αmax,γ=2 ' 0.6 and αmax,γ=3 ' 0.5, and fR ' 1 for α & αmax,γ . It is caused
by the increased viability of the dissenting opinion, as we have explained so far.
Given the condition, the main factor responsible for the successful spreading
of the dissenting opinion is the existence of isolated groups of agents in the
followship network and the type of opinion they protect. As shown in Fig. 5(c),
the separated nodes are generally less influential, so they are initially likely
to have the dissenting opinion. Therefore, the isolation can effectively protect
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the dissenting opinion during the comparison process. We also confirm it by
measuring the probability of isolation for each node.
In summary, the system reaches the opinion consensus more rapidly in the
γ = 2 case which is a more heterogeneous system regarding degree and authority.
On the contrary, a more homogeneous structure (γ = 3) promotes the spreading
of the dissenting opinion more, even though it takes longer time, compared to
the γ = 2 case. For the spreading of the dissenting opinion, a confidence level
exceeding a certain threshold confidence level is required, i.e., α > αmax,γ , and
it can lead the successful spreading of the dissenting opinion with low values of
p < 0.1.
4. Summary and conclusions
We have introduced a stylized opinion formation model to understand the
spreading of the less influential agents’ opinion by setting the correlation be-
tween the degree and the authority score, with personal characteristics such as
the confidence level and the willingness to accept the dissenting opinion. First of
all, nonzero amount of willingness to accept the dissenting opinion, albeit small,
drastically promotes the spreading of the dissenting opinion in most cases. Non-
trivial steady states, or the coexistence of different opinions, is possible when
the degree and the authority score are positively correlated in the case of severe
heterogeneity, namely, when the power-law exponent γ ≤ 2. It implies that the
strong authoritarian structure, combined with its correlation to the number of
neighbors, efficiently suppresses the acceptance of the opposing opinion from
less influential people.
For given heterogeneity and correlation, the confidence level α toward the
agents’ own opinion is the major factor deciding the prevalence of the dissenting
opinion, even though it may take a long time. In particular, the parameter α
controls the viability of the dissenting opinion, via the segregation of the opinion-
spreading subgroups in the comparison process. By incorporating the personal
factors in the model, we have learned two things. First, if a population has
21
the willingness to hear the dissenting opinion held by less influential people,
there is a large chance for the effective spreading of their opinion. Second,
from the critical role of the confidence level, we infer that if the confidence of
each agent is strong enough, the opinion of less influential people can be spread
to the entire population even in the case of severely heterogeneous authority
and degree distribution. Since our model is a highly simplified one, it may
not capture all of the details in the real opinion formation processes in our
society. For example, the assumption of the same power-law exponent for the
authority and degree distribution could be a limitation of the model. In spite
of the limitations, though, the results suggest a possibility of the crucial impact
on the correlations between the network and authority structures in opinion
formation. For future studies, with the necessity of studies with a spreading
of misinformation [31, 32] from the authorities, the model could be applied to
figure out effects of the authority and a correlated network on the spreading of
misinformation in a hierarchical structure.
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